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The concept of design as a social process accords with the constructivist position on 
knowledge generation, and is widely supported in the design research literature (see, for 
example, Amabile, 1983; Berger & Luckman, 1987; Buchiarelli, 1984; Chung & Whitefield, 
1999; Cooper & Love, 1993; Cross & Cross, 1996; Dilnot, 1982; Dorsa & Walker, 1999; 
Gregory & Hedberg, 2001; Guba, 1990; Papanek, 1984; Verma, 1997). Viewing design as a 
social process has, however,  both advantages and disadvantages. Of key importance to the 
field of design research is how the concept of ‘design as a social process’ articulates with 
other design theories and with theories from other disciplines to support the development of 
a coherent body of theory about designing and designs.  
 
 This paper takes a critical perspective.  It identifies and pragmatically explores four topic 
areas important to understanding the practical connections and interrelationships between 
the concepts of design and social process as they relate to improving the design of new 
products, systems and services. The paper pays places particular emphasis on maximising 
coherent connections with concepts, theories and research findings in other disciplines.  
The analyses in this paper derive from four research projects: the author’s PhD into the 
inclusion of social, ethical and environmental factors in engineering design theory; ongoing 
study of the physiological mechanisms that underpin human designing; an exploration of the 
roles of affective (feeling) processes in design cognition; and the development of a coherent 
theory frame that integrates design theories and organisational theories. 
 
Most designing is undertaken in commercial, and thus social contexts (see, for example, 
Buchiarelli, 1984; Friedman & Tellefsen, 1997; Tellefsen, 2001, 2000). Designers play key 
roles in the conversion of new scientific knowledge into designed real world products, 
systems and services that are the physical manifestations of innovation processes. This is 
seen as a key driver of economic and social development in developed and developing 
nations (see, for example, Academy of Finland, 1997; Commonwealth of Australia, 2001; 
Dept of Industry Science and Resources, 1999, pp. 3, 9-10; Innovation Summit 
Implementation Group, 2000; Leith, 1995; National Science Foundation, 2001, 1998; The 
British Council, 2001). Increasingly, the main modality of designing is through 
multidisciplinary design teams: a practice that is well established in design fields with a high 
value and high levels of design input such as spacecraft and aerospace design work. 
Multidisciplinary design teams are now increasingly being adopted in less-technical design 
domains: the days of the genius individual designer have all but disappeared. These changes 
are mainly as a result of: increasing levels of complexity in designed artifacts; increased 
emphasis on the participation of other stakeholders (e.g. users) in design processes; and 
continuing specialisation in design education. The use of multidisciplinary design teams is a 
substantial shift from ‘single domain’ designing, in which a design is undertaken by one or 
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more designers in a single discipline who call on technical information from experts in other 
disciplines, and from ‘serial’ designing in which experts from individual domains undertake 
work on a design in sequence. In all of these forms of designing, the design processes 
depend on social communication between the stakeholders and their representatives for 
satisfactory progress of the design outcome. A key question, however, is how, and whether, 
theories about social activity are epistemologically best articulated with theories about the 
activity of designing. 




2. Dimensions of ‘Design as a Social Process’ 
   
For the field of Design Research, the most important issue in deciding whether, or 
how, to bring together the concepts of ‘design’ and ‘social process’ is how such a 
move contributes to building a coherent body of theory about designing and designs. 
The justification and validation of co-joining specific theories in these areas are 
dependent on: how well the result comports with existing theories in these fields and 
with well-established theories from other disciplines; and on the strength of the 
epistemological foundations, especially in terms of empirical data and the phenomena 
being represented. For the concept ‘design as a social process’, several topic areas are 
of interest in exploring the measure of its epistemological coherency. These include:   
 
A. Process issues: How do design processes and social processes overlap and 
interact?  
B. Definitions: What are the bounds of the concepts of ‘design’ and ‘social process’  
C. Human Processes: How are the ways human designing is shaped by social 
processes actualised by individual physiological processes  
D. Epistemological issues: Which epistemological perspective is best to explore 
whether and how design is a social process? How will radical changes due to new 
knowledge from cognitive-neuroscience impact on the relevance of observation- 
based human science disciplines such as psychology and sociology in whether, or 
how, design is best viewed as a social process?  
 
Clarifying the practicalities of viewing design as a social process requires exploring 




3. Process Issues 
   
Exploring whether or how designing should be viewed as a social process prompts the 
question ‘can designing occur outside of being a social process’? There are two parts 
to the question. The first is to ask whether, for an individual, all designing must, at 
root, depend on social interactions. The second is to ask whether day-to-day designing 
must always be, or is better, regarded as a social process, or whether it is better 
regarded as an individual activity that is undertaken in a social context. 
 
The first issue (whether designing is essentially determined by social interactions) is 
dependent on as yet unresolved philosophical arguments as to: whether all symbolism 
depends on social interactions; whether cognition is more than a conscious process 
that depends on symbol processing; and whether the human activity of designing, in 
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terms of what happens inside an individual, is essentially dependent on symbols 
derived from social interaction. Recent findings from research into the affective basis 
of cognition suggest that neither of these is correct (see, for example, Damasio, 1999, 
1994; Love, 2001; Sloman, 2001). There is also everyday anecdotal evidence that 
designing may occur without being essentially part of a social process, e.g. the role of 
designing in personal projects such as: individual doodling, syncopated movement, 
and music made for oneself. It is clear, however that social interaction, like design 
outcomes can act as a major amplifier of analysis, symbol generation and symbol use 
(Agre, 2000). What is not clear is whether these individual human design processes 
and mechanisms are essentially dependent on social processes. This is a key issue in 
deciding whether it is epistemologically better to found theories about designing on 
the idea that they are social activities or not. In times of epistemological uncertainty, it 
is usually better to separate concepts rather than unjustifiably conflate them: 
conceptual identity has precedence over conceptual equivalence when building new 
theory. Together, these factors suggest it is better to keep the concepts of ‘design’ and 
‘social process’ separate. 
 
The second issue involves deciding whether designing can be undertaken at an 
individual level, independent of social interactions, through the use of self generated 
symbols or symbols derived at other times via social processes. Clarity about what is 
meant by ‘designing’ and ‘social process’ is important here.  O’Docherty (1964) 
counseled researchers to be careful to choose definitions that do not prove useless 
because they include everything and hence define nothing. The issue of definitions is 
addressed in more detail in the next section. In general terms, it is clear individual 
designers or designers within design teams undertake social interactions as part of or 
associated with design processes; use symbols and practices that have been developed 
as a result of interactions with others; create designed outcomes that will be socially 
situated; and draw on knowledge embodied in a field of knowers. These do not 
repudiate the possibility that designing can be undertaken individually, in moments 
independent of social interaction. They are insufficient evidence, at this stage, to 
confirm that designing is therefore always better regarded as a social process. Other 






   
The need for clarity in terminology is pressing. A review of definitions of ‘design’ 
and ‘design process’ in over 400 publications showed that there were approximately 
as many definitions of ‘design’ as authors (Love, 2000, 1998). In many cases, authors 
used the terms ’design’ or ‘design process’ in ways different from how they had 
explicitly defined them. It is not uncommon to find different and contradictory 
meanings evident in the same text, paragraph or even sentence. The nominalization of 
‘designing’ (a verb referring to an activity) into ‘design’ (a noun concept) compounds 
the confusion. Some of the variety of meanings loosely attributed to the term, ‘design’ 
include: 
 
• ‘The activity of designing’  
•  ‘Specification for the manufacture of an artifact, system or service’  
Love, Terence (2003) Design as a social process: bodies, brains and social aspects of designing, 
Journal of Design Research 3(1). 
 
 
•  ‘An artifact’  
•  ‘Humans and parts of humans’ (whether designing or not) as in ‘God designed 
humans’ and ‘ the brain is designed to...’  
 
As all human artificial arrangements (including language and knowledge) can be 
regarded as products of human designing (Simon, 1981), then the term design 
becomes problematic (as O’Doherty (1964) observed) because it includes too much to 
provide conceptual precision. 
 
Similar problems are evident in relation to the phrase ‘social process’. For social 
constructivists such as Berger and Luckman (1987), all knowledge creation is a social 
process. Consequently, all activity that depends on the  ‘body of human knowledge’ 
in some way is also part of a social process, regardless of whether the activity is 
undertaken by an individual alone. This perspective requires care because it is 
important to avoid over extending the concept of ‘social process’ so that all is social 
process (e.g. thinking feeling, behaving, conceiving, deciding) and, like ‘design’, 
losing the analytical explanatory power of the concept of social process because all is 
subsumed within it. If these unhelpfully extended meanings of ‘design’ and ‘social 
process’ are brought together, then ‘design as a social process’ encompasses so many 
processes and outcomes that the phrase comes very close to meaning ‘‘everything’ as 
‘everything’. As a result, the terminological and conceptual precision necessary to 
sound theory making is lost. 
 
It is also important in using the term ‘designing’, to make sure its meaning is not 
unduly diluted by inadvertently and inappropriately including other activities that are 
already well defined elsewhere (see, for example, Love, 2002, 2001, 2000). Examples 
include the differences between designing and information gathering, and between 
designing and calculating. If ‘designing’ is defined as including all activities that 
designers undertake, it loses its specificity and usefulness in building theory, and 
becomes useless in theorising about design as a social process because it is 
terminologically insufficient to differentiate between designing, social process and 
any other activities involved. 
 
Prior research (Love, 2001, 2001) indicated it is necessary to distinguish between the 
internal and external activities of designing to maintain epistemological coherence. 
The following definitions were developed to improve on previous definitions in the 
literature by addressing their epistemological shortfalls and providing a sound basis 
for building design theories that are coherent with developments in other disciplines. 
They align with outcomes of similar analyses by Coyne and Snodgrass (1993) 
 
• ‘Design’ - a noun referring to a specification for making a particular artefact 
or for undertaking a particular activity. A distinction is drawn here between 
a design and an artefact - the design is the basis for and precursor to the 
making of the artefact. In this sense, this distinguishes the outcomes of 
designing from the outputs of craft or art alone.  
• ‘Designing’ - non-routine human internal activity leading to the production of a 
design.  
• ‘Designer’ - someone who is, has been, or will be designing. Someone who creates 
designs  
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•  ‘Design process’ - any process or activity that includes at least one act of ‘designing’ 
alongside other activities such as, calculating, drawing, information collection many 
of which are, or can be, routine or automated.  
 
The argument for separating external and internal aspects of designing (that they are 
epistemologically incommensurate (Popper, 1976)) also applies to social activities. It 
implies that ‘social process’ should be defined to reflect only the external aspects of 
interactions between people, e.g. 
 
• ‘Social process’ - any process or activity that includes at least one act of social 
interaction between people alongside other activities. 
   
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  
5. Human Processes: Underlying Causal Explanations 
   
Developing theories of  ‘design as a social process’ that fit with hard-won human 
knowledge across a wide variety of disciplines to a large extent depends on 
understanding of the means by which the human processes of designing and social 
processes are actualized. In the case of both ‘designing’ and ‘social process’: both are 
human activities; and both depend on human cognition, feelings, emotions, learning, 
understanding, and judgment. Any explanation of ‘design as a social processes’ 
should be able to reach deep into an understanding of their causal mechanisms 
(mainly derived from research via other disciplines). It would be expected that 
theories about ‘design as a social process’ would build on theories about these causal 
mechanisms in unambiguous and transparent ways.  
 
Both designing and social processes depend strongly on empathy and other dynamic 
tacit interpersonal communication processes. In the case of designing, empathy 
underpins, e.g. the means of mentally envisioning whether users would be happy with 
a particular solution. It underpins, however, many other internal sub-processes of 
designing (see, for example, for other aspects Damasio, 1994; Love, 2000; Love, 
1999). In social processes, empathy refers to those activities by which one individual 
‘feels’ what is happening in another individual – an essential aspect of 
communication. If empathy and these other tacit interpersonal processes are not to be 
regarded as magic or telepathic events of a sort unknowable to scientific inquiry then 
they must be explicable in terms of individuals’ human internal physiological 
processes. They cannot be explained causally in any other manner whether via 
information (about the other) and information flows, or in terms of social dynamics. 
This is because anything other than human internal physiology offers only external 
correlatory indicators rather than causal foundations for theory about either the 
realities of social processes or communication modalities between individuals. 
 
New research findings in neurology, neuro-psychology, artificial intelligence, 
information processing, design research, biology, endocrinology, cognitive science, 
ethology brought together by the combined effort of researchers across these 
disciplines, are now resulting in an understanding of the underlying internal human 
physiological processes by which both designing and social processes come into 
being and are directed through individuals’ conscious and unconscious agency. What 
is emerging is a picture that involves many complex body systems that bring together 
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feelings, emotions, and motor responses as part and parcel of cognition.  
From this perspective, body systems can be seen as physiological precursors, in a 
primitive organism, produce motor responses to improve the organism’s relationship 
with its environment, e.g. by protecting it and ensuing long term survival (Damasio, 
1999). The potential of these primitive cognito-affective-motor systems have been 
extended in humans by being overlaid with other more sophisticated systems built 
from and on them. Together these result in a human’s brain and associated 
neurological, hormonal, visceral and skeletal systems operating in concert to create 
designs and undertake social processes. Human cognito-affective-motor physiological 
systems and processes are not simple, but they are becoming increasingly well 
understood through brain research.  
 
The physiological actualisation of human internal design activities is commonly based 
on internally held representations of contexts – substantially under conscious 
cognitive control. In mechanism these echo the processes used for simpler responses 
between humans as organisms to their external environmental circumstances through 
internal representations held in both mind and body. The context of internal activities 
of designing may relate to human social interactions but this doesn’t mean that all 
contextual interactions are social process.  At a neurobiological level, some aspects of 
internal designing are enabled by primary emotion/feeling systems and secondary 
systems in the neo cortex that are not necessarily created by social interactions – any 
interactions inside and outside an individual will do (Damasio, 1999, 1994). This 
means that some internal aspects of designing are not part of  ‘social process’ and 




6. Epistemological Issues 
   
The discussion in the previous sections forms the basis for describing and addressing 
epistemological issues. The main epistemological issue, the underlying question, is 
‘How can we define ‘design as a social process’ in ways that comport best with other 
well-established human knowledge?’ This approach of choosing the meanings of 
terms (‘design’, ‘social process’ and ‘design as social process’) to build coherent 
theory contrasts with approaches that try to identify or argue that “‘design’ or ‘social 
process’ is ‘X’” In most cases, in epistemological terms, the latter approaches are 
unhelpfully  ‘wrong headed’.  
 
One of the difficulties with research and theorymaking associated with both designing 
and social process is that they have been built on second hand data, i.e. observations 
of human behaviours that provide correlations rather than causal explanations. These 
external behaviours are the precedents and antecedents of designing and human social 
interactions. They are consequences of the processes rather than the activities 
themselves. Making theory about designing and social processes by observing 
behaviour is as epistemologically and practically problematic as trying to infer the 
electronic circuits of a calculator by observing the numbers on its display. (In theory, 
there is no upper bound to the number of possible models of internal functioning that 
can represent external behaviour.) To understand and make accurate theory about 
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designing and social processes it is necessary to look at the human internal processes, 
as it is these that provide causal information. 
 
In this context, there is emerging a radical shift in all disciplines that have so far 
depended on using tacitly assumed models of internal functioning to provide a 
reference point for building theory on correlatory evidence from observations of 
external behaviours. This radical change emerging in disciplines such as psychology, 
sociology, and other social sciences is due to new findings of brain research. These 
new findings from cognitive neuroscience and other physiologically based fields 
studying the foundations of human agency are beginning to offer new and direct 
causal knowledge about human functioning that has been inaccessible previously. The 
implications about theorymaking in the field of design research are literally radical. 
Potentially, they completely replace (as in delete all and insert) many of the existing 
theories about designing and social processes that have been based on theories from 
psychology, informatics and the social sciences – disciplines that are themselves 





7. Conclusions and Implications 
   
Designing is a human activity often undertaken in social contexts. Many aspects of 
designing are undertaken within individuals. There are many processes involving 
people in which some of the participant are undertaking internally, design activities.  
 
This paper has suggests that it is important to differentiate between ‘the human 
internal processes of designing’ and ‘external processes, many of which are social in 
nature, that include at least one individual undertaking internal design activities’. The 
paper suggests that a convenient terminological distinction between these internal and 
external aspects is to use the term ‘design process’ to refer to the external activities 
and the term ‘designing’ to refer to the physiologically actualized internal design 
activities. 
 
The focus of this paper is on building coherent theory foundations or design research. 
Part of this endeavour is to establish clear definitions of the terms, ‘design process’ 
and ‘social process’, that avoid conflation and reflect epistemological differences in 
their relationships to other concepts and to the empirical realities that they participate 
in representing in the construction of other theories. The analyses developed in 
previous sections show the following relationships: 
 
A ‘design process’ May be embedded in A ‘social process’ 
A ‘social process’ May be embedded in A ‘design process’ 
‘Internal activity of designing  
in an individual’ May be embedded in ‘Social processes’ 
‘Social processes’ May be influenced by ‘Individuals’ internal activities of designing’ 
‘Social processes’ in combination 
with a ‘design process’ and May result in A design for a ‘design process’ 
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‘individuals’ internal activities of 
designing’ 
‘Individuals’ internal design 
activity’ May result in A design for a ‘social process’ 
 
These relationships distinguish between ‘design process’, ‘social process’ and ‘the 
internal human activity of designing’, and map out possibilities for causal 
relationships between them. Together, they start to establish a basis for understanding 
the character of the relationship between designing and social processes on which 
further work can be developed. The natural extension of the arguments presented in 
this paper is a move away from sociological and psychological theory building about 
design and social process. To date these have depended on tacit assumptions about 
human internal function (e.g. how people think, respond, are motivated) based on 
correlatory evidence of external human behaviours. It is now increasingly possible to 
build design theory and social process theory on direct observations of human internal 
processes due to new developments in cognitive neuroscience. These new 
developments offer the basis for using causal relationships as a basis for theory 
making, rather than the second-hand correlatory data on which many existing social 
theories are based. 
 
The implications are profound and radical. They require careful definition of concepts 
of ‘design’, ‘social process’, ‘design process’ and associated concepts that will 
continue to be relevant when the human internal mechanisms that result in their 
actualisation are understood. 
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